

### Seðlabanki Íslands

## Iceland: From boom to bust and back again

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


## Background: The build-up and unwinding of large imbalances


# The rise and fall of an enormous banking system



Banking system assets and leverage



Expansion of bank balance sheets in the run-up to the financial crisis



Consolidated accounts of three largest commercial banks. 2008 data is end-June.


*Source:* Central Bank of Iceland, Financial Supervisory Authority, Statistics Iceland.

Source: IMF, Central Bank of Iceland.

### An asset price boom-bust cycle




### International financial market liquidity and the króna exchange rate



The liquidity index shows the number of standard deviations from the mean (exponential moving average) from a simple average of nine liquidity measures,

Real asset prices




Source: Statistics Iceland, Central Bank of Iceland.

Source: Bank of England, Central Bank of Iceland.

# High debt levels were accumulated with significant FX exposures




Bank assets and private sector debt in the run-up to the crisis



The year in parentheses represents the onset of the crisis in the country concerned.

Source: Reuters EcoWin, Bank of England, Central Bank of Iceland.

### Proportion of total foreign-denominated debt



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.


## Huge imbalances build up and then unwound



Expenditure shares in GDP and 30 year average shares



#### Current account balance



Income account balance excl. DMBs undergoing winding-up proceedings

— Headline current account balance

Source: Statistics Iceland, Central Bank of Iceland.


Source: Statistics Iceland, Central Bank of Iceland.

# Policy responses proved insufficient and the policy mix inappropriate


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**Fiscal policy** 

Monetary policy



Public investment, contribution to GDP growth (right axis) Public consumption, contribution to GDP growth (right axis) —Public expenditure (left axis)




Source: Statistics Iceland, Central Bank of Iceland.

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
# The collapse triggered a large adjustment in income and demand...



Disposable income, employment and unemployment




### Private consumption and contributions of its main components



## ... But net exports provided a buffer for output




### World trade and Icelandic exports in the current crisis



<sup>—</sup>Total imports among Iceland's main trading partners

#### Source: OECD, Central Bank of Iceland.

### Output growth and contribution of its main components





Source: Statistics Iceland.

# Inflation was high pre-crisis but soared after the currency collapse

Inflation and domestic imbalances

#### Inflation and the exchange rate cycle







# A large contraction in international comparison...



#### Consumption levels in current crisis






Unemployment rate in current crisis

% of labour force (seasonally adjusted), normalised at zero in 2008Q3

#### -----Average of 46 medium-to-high income countries

GDP levels in current crisis



-----Average of 46 medium-to-high income countries

Source: Macrobonds, Eurostat, Central Bank of Iceland.

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
## ... and the direct fiscal costs are larger than in most other countries

#### SLABA SLANDS

### Composition of direct fiscal costs for Iceland (% of 2009 nominal GDP)

Losses on loans to failed banks made by Central Bank	11.1
Other losses on loans to failed banks	1.8
Net costs of recapitalisation of failed banks	3.8
Costs of recapitalisation of Housing Finance Fund	2.1
Costs of called loan guarantees	1.5
Total costs	20.3

### Direct fiscal costs of the financial crisis over 2007-2009



*Sources*: Laeven and Valencia (2010), "Resolution of banking crises: The good, the bad, and the ugly", IMF Working Paper, no. 10/146, and the OECD (2011) for Iceland and Ireland.



### Post-crisis policy responses


### Monetary policy

### Focus on stabilising currency and disinflation

 High debt and FX exposure meant that the ISK collapse wreaked havoc in domestic balance sheets

#### Initial focus of monetary policy

- Fostering stability of ISK while the restructuring and recovery of balance sheets takes place
- Avoid disorderly capital outflows further weakening the ISK
- Using interest rate policy and capital controls
- Exchange rate stability and disinflation allowed for gradual easing of monetary policy



#### Central Bank of Iceland interest rates






### **Fiscal policy**

### Consolidation to ensure debt sustainability

- Fundamental changes in Government finances
- The crisis led to a sharp reversal from surplus to deficit
  - 2007: +5.4% of GDP
  - 2008: -13½% of GDP
- Gross debt increased from below 30% of GDP in 2007 to 95% this year
- Expenditure cuts and increased taxes needed to ensure a gradual closing of the deficit and a sustainable debt path

**Public sector finances** 










## The economic outlook: The road to recovery

# The króna has stabilised as risk premia has subsided



Exchange rate of the króna

CDS spread and exchange rate volatility



Source: Central Bank of Iceland.

Source: Bloomberg.

# A slow and gradual recovery has taken hold



Output growth in selected industrial countries first half of 2011


Change on a year before (%) Sweden Finland Germany Canada Iceland France USA Denmark Ireland UK Spain Norway Portugal Greece -2 2 -6 -4 0 4 6

%	2011	2012	2013
Consumption	3.8	2.3	2.6
Investment	10.3	16.2	11.2
Domestic demand	4.0	2.6	3.6
Exports	1.9	1.5	3.5
GDP	2.8	1.6	3.7
Unemployment	7.1	6.2	5.8

# But challenges remain: Private sector debt levels are high...




#### Household gross debt in 2010



*Sources:* International Monetary Fund, Central Bank of Iceland and S. Cecchetti, M. Mohanty and F. Zampolli (2011). "The real effects of debt". BIS Working Papers, no. 352.

#### Corporate gross debt in 2010




*Sources:* International Monetary Fund, Central Bank of Iceland and S. Cecchetti, M. Mohanty and F. Zampolli (2011). "The real effects of debt". BIS Working Papers, no. 352.

# ... Debt restructuring has progressed slowly...




#### Composition of loan book



In default by 90 days or payment unlikely

- Performing, w/o restructuring
- Performing, after restructuring

### Share of non-performing corporate loans in selected post-crisis episodes




The year in parentheses represents the onset of the crisis in the country concerned. Values for Korea and Thailand refer to 2-3 years after the crisis.

Source: Central Bank of Iceland, Financial Stability Report, 2011/1.


# ... And inflation has started to rise agained to rise agained to the back of excessive wage increases

Unit labour costs and contributions of underlying components 2000 - 2013



Positive labour productivity growth is shown as a negative contribution to an increase in unit labour costs.

Inflation outlook



— Headline inflation — Inflation target

Source: Statistics Iceland, Central Bank of Iceland.

Sources: Statistics Iceland, Central Bank of Iceland.